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I. INTRODUCTION
For over 100 years debate has raged in academia and in the courts over the
standards of admissibility for expert testimony. From Learned Hand to Frye v.
United States to the Federal Rules of Evidence and beyond, courts and commentators
have struggled with the threshold for expert testimony. For scientific and technical
testimony, the changing world has only exacerbated the difficulty of the issue. One
hundred years ago, quantum mechanics didn’t exist, the theory of relativity had yet
to be invented (and superceded), and the quark hadn’t been discovered. As far as the
stock market was concerned, trades were executed by hand and the New York Stock
Exchange bore a closer resemblance to the men who executed the Buttonwood Tree
Agreement than today’s computerized trading pits. As science and technology have
evolved, so has the test for expert testimony in these areas.
In class action securities litigation, a pitched battle is often fought over the size of
the class. The question boils down to how many of the shares purchased during the
class period are shares which are traded during the class period for the first time and
how many shares are traded repeatedly throughout the class period. Those shares
which are traded in the class period for the first time are damaged to the full extent of
the fraud. Shares which trade more than once during the class period count towards
reported volume, but can only be damaged to the full extent of the fraud once. For
example, A buys a share of stock after the price is inflated by fraud. While the stock
price is still inflated by the fraud, A sells his share to B. Reported class period
volume will reflect at least two shares purchased.3 But A has recouped some or all of
his loss by selling at an inflated price, and if the market price was still inflated by the
full value of the false information, only B has suffered the full extent of the fraud.
Determining how much of reported volume during the class period represents
repurchases and how much represents new purchases is thus critical to determining
class-wide damages.
To solve this problem, experts use the Proportionate Trading Model (“PTM”).
The PTM assumes that a fixed proportion of shares purchased on each day represent
newly traded versus previously traded shares. While there is some debate over
whether the shares should be drawn in equal proportions or some other proportion,
virtually every expert, whether testifying for the defendants or plaintiffs, now uses
some form of the PTM.
The Supreme Court, in a trilogy of cases in the 1990s, set forth the requirements
for admissibility of expert testimony. It is the authors’ contention that the PTM,

3

If the stock is traded on the NASDAQ, more than two shares can be reflected in reported
volume. See infra note 67, and accompanying text.
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drawing shares into the new and previously traded groups in equal proportions,
meets the criteria for admission.
II. EVOLUTION OF TEST FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Learned Hand
Judge Learned Hand kicked off the modern dispute about expert testimony with
an article in Harvard Law Review published in 1900.4 Judge Hand begins the article
by stating that “[t]here are good historical reasons” for calling expert witnesses, “but
they by no means justify” doing so, and it is “an anomaly fertile of much practical
inconvenience.”5 Thus the modern hostility to expert testimony was born, or at least
given its first influential public airing.
Judge Hand’s objection to expert testimony was premised on the expert’s
inability to testify to the facts of the case and his ability to testify only to general
propositions on his area of expertise.6 The problem for Judge Hand was how the jury
was to choose between conflicting expert testimony. If the jury had experience in
the subject matter, the experts would be unnecessary; if they had no experience, how
can they choose which expert to believe? “It is just because they are incompetent for
such a task that the expert is necessary at all.”7 Judge Hand’s solution to this
dilemma was to suggest an independent tribunal of experts to hear the expert
testimony.8 This tribunal would decide which general propositions to put to the jury,
and the jury could then apply these general propositions to the facts of the case.9
B. Frye v. United States
The seminal case of Frye v. United States,10 which stood as the standard for
admissibility of expert testimony for seventy years, is two pages long. At issue was
the appellate court’s refusal to admit exculpatory evidence of a primitive polygraph,
or lie detector test.11 The court recognized that expert testimony was admissible, but
stated
[j]ust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
4

Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Concerning Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1900).
5

Id. at 40.

6

Id. at 50-52.

7

Id. at 54.

8

Id. at 56.

9

Id.

10

293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

11

Id. at 1013. The test in question measured changes in blood pressure as the respondent
answered questions.
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discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.12
This brief opinion would be followed for seventy years, even after the passage of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
To some extent, the Frye test performs some of the function Judge Hand
envisioned in 1900. By insisting on general acceptance in the scientific community,
the scientific community is, in effect, acting as the expert tribunal of Judge Hand.
The scientific community weeds out the good science from the bad and the general
propositions put to the jury to aid it in its deliberations are those on which there is
widespread agreement. Thus, the jury should be spared the task of having to choose
between experts with regard to general scientific principles, but not with regard to
application of those principles.
C. Federal Rule of Evidence 702
The Federal Rules of Evidence were passed in 1975. The question of whether the
Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically Rules 401, 402, and 702, superceded the
Frye test was not addressed in the Rules, the Advisory Committee’s Notes, the
Congressional Committee Reports, or the hearing on the Federal Rules. Rule 401
defines “relevant evidence” as that which has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable.13 Rule 402 states that all relevant evidence is admissible, unless
otherwise prescribed.14 Rule 702, which specifically governs the admissibility of
expert testimony, states that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact in issue, a witness may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.”15 Courts were split over whether the Federal Rules of
Evidence superceded the Frye test for the next twenty years.16

12

Id. at 1014.

13

FED. R. EVID. 401. “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence.” Id.
14

FED. R. EVID. 402. “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.” Id.
15

Fed. R. Evid. 702.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Id.
16

For a detailed description of the Frye debate, see Symposium on Science and the Rules of
Evidence, 99 Fed. R. Dec. 187 (William A. Thomas, ed., 1983).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss3/5

4

2004-05]

PROPORTIONATE TRADING MODEL

395

D. The Daubert/Joiner/Kumho Tire Trilogy
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,17 the Supreme Court decided
two questions. The first was whether the Frye test of general acceptance survived
the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The second was what standard should
be applied if the Frye test was not used.
The facts of Daubert are relatively simple. The parents of a minor born with
birth defects sued the maker of the drug Bendectin, alleging the mother’s use of the
drug during pregnancy caused the birth defects.18 The defendant moved for
summary judgment, claiming there was no admissible evidence that Bendectin
caused birth defects in humans.19 The defendant submitted an affidavit of an
epidemologist who stated he had reviewed all the literature on Bendectin and birth
defects (30 published studies involving over 130,000 patients) and no study found
that Bendectin was capable of causing malformations in human fetuses.20 The
plaintiffs countered with eight experts of their own, who concluded that Bendectin
can cause birth defects.21 These experts based their conclusions on animal test-tube
studies, live animal studies, and the reanalysis of previously published studies which
had concluded there was no causation.22 The trial judge refused to admit the
evidence, holding that it did not meet the general acceptance standard; the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the same grounds.23
In determining whether Frye survived the passage of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the Court began with Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402.24 Rule 402
states “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided. . . .
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”25 Rule 401 defines relevant
evidence as “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”26 After considering the specific text of Rule 702 and the
“liberal thrust” of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court held that the Frye test
was not assimilated into Rule 702.27 Ultimately, the Court held “[t]hat austere

17

509 U.S. 579 (1993).

18

Id. at 582.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id. at 583. The credentials of the experts were beyond reproach. Id. at 582.

22

Id.

23

951 F.2d 1128 (1991).

24

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-88.

25

FED. R. EVID. 402.

26

FED. R. EVID. 401.

27

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89.
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[general acceptance] standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules
of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.”28
Having determined that the Frye test did not apply, the Court examined the
gatekeeping responsibilities of the trial judge. The Court began with the definitions
of “scientific” and “knowledge.” Scientific “implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science.”29 Knowledge “connotes more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation.”30 While acknowledging that the subject of the scientific
testimony need not be known to a certainty, because there are arguably no certainties
in science, the Court noted that the inference or assertion “must be derived by the
scientific method.”31 In a footnote, the Court took pains to distinguish between
scientific reliability, scientific validity, and evidentiary reliability.32 Scientific
reliability is whether the application of the principle produces consistent results.33
Scientific validity is whether the principle supports what it purports to show.34
Evidentiary reliability, for scientific evidence, will be based on scientific validity.35
The Court held that a trial judge must make a “preliminary assessment of whether
the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether that reasoning or methodology can be applied to the facts in issue.”36
The initial inquiry is whether the expert testimony “will assist the trier of fact
understand or determine a fact in issue.”37
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory
or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be
whether it can be (and has been) tested. “Scientific methodology today is
based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be
falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from
other fields of human inquiry.”38
The second consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected
to peer review and publication. The Court, however, took pains to point out this
factor is not dispositive.39 The third consideration is the known or potential rate of
28

Id. at 589.

29

Id. at 590.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id. at 590 n.9

33

Id. at 599.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 592-93.

37

Id. at 592.

38

Id. at 593 (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in
Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW.
U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992)).
39

Id.
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error and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s
operations.40 The final factor is the “general acceptance” of the theory: Widespread
acceptance can be an important factor in admitting testimony and minimal support
may be a factor in excluding it.41
The Court emphasized the Rule 702 inquiry was flexible, and the “overarching
subject is the scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability of
the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”42
It also addressed the concerns that abandonment of the general acceptance test would
“result in a free-for-all in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and
irrational pseudoscientific assertions.”43 The Court rejected such concerns, holding
that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”44
The unspoken undercurrent in the Daubert opinion, and the subject of fierce
debate in the lower courts and academia, was how to deal with expert testimony
based on “junk science.” The Daubert Court never explicitly uses this term,
although the testimony at issue is what some would consider to be a paradigmatic
example of junk science. At its core, the plaintiffs’ experts in Daubert took
overwhelmingly convincing evidence to the contrary, and without doing any
additional scientific studies, simply concluded that the original scientists’ work
supported the opposite conclusion than the one originally stated. The closest the
Daubert Court comes to addressing this issue is an aside when it states that the study
of the moon “will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was
unusually likely to have behaved irrationally” on the night of a full moon.45 Even so,
the Daubert Court stops short of saying the plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony at issue was
inadmissible. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with
the opinion. The door was thus left open that the testimony, questionable though it
may have been, was in fact admissible, and the adversary system, through effective
advocacy, cross-examination, and opposing experts, would expose the testimony as
being not credible, or at least much less credible than the opposing side’s testimony.

40

Id. at 594.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 594-95.

43

Id. at 595.

44

Id. at 596.

45
Id. at 591. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part in General Electric
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), returned to this theme. “An example of ‘junk science’ that
should be excluded under Daubert as too unreliable would be the testimony of a phrenologist
who would purport to prove a defendant’s future dangerousness based on the contours of the
defendant’s skull.” Id. at 154 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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2. General Electric Co. v. Joiner
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,46 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine which standard should be applied by an appellate court reviewing a
decision to admit or exclude testimony under Daubert. The short answer to this
question is that an abuse of discretion standard should be applied.47 The Court then
went beyond the scope of its grant of certiorari and discussed whether, when
applying this standard, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert
testimony.48
In Joiner, the plaintiff was an electrician who was exposed to PCBs in the course
of his work. The plaintiff alleged that his exposure to PCBs “promoted” his lung
cancer; specifically, had it not been for his exposure to PCBs, his lung cancer would
not have developed for years, if at all. The trial court ruled that although there was a
genuine issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was exposed to PCBs, the plaintiff’s
experts’ testimony failed to show a link between PCBs and small-cell lung cancer,
and was, therefore, inadmissible. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
“[b]ecause the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony display a
preference for admissibility, we apply a particularly stringent standard of review to
the trial judge’s exclusion of expert testimony.”49 The Supreme Court held that the
“particularity stringent” standard was erroneous, and the correct standard was the
usual abuse of discretion.50
The plaintiff’s experts had relied upon animal studies, in which mice were
exposed to PCBs, as well as epidemiological studies. The Court examined whether
these studies could have been a proper foundation for the testimony at issue. As
phrased by the Court, “whether animal studies can ever be a proper foundation for an
expert’s opinion was not the issue. The issue was whether these expert’s opinions
were sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they purported to rely.”51
In so phrasing the issue, the Joiner Court seems to have run afoul of the Daubert
Court’s admonition that the focus be on principles and methodology, not the
conclusions drawn therefrom. But answering this criticism, the Court stated that
“conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct.”52
3. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael
Daubert involved expert scientific testimony. In the six years that followed
Daubert, the lower courts were divided as to whether the principles set forth in
Daubert applied only to expert scientific testimony or also to technical and other

46

522 U.S. 136 (1997).

47

Id. at 139.

48

Id. at 142.

49

78 F.3d 524, 529 (11th Cir. 1996).

50

522 U.S. at 142.

51

Id. at 144.

52

Id. at 146.
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expert testimony.53 The Supreme Court decided the issue in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael.54
Kumho Tire involved a products liability lawsuit against a tire manufacturer for a
blow-out that caused death and serious injury.55 An engineer testified for the
plaintiff concerning the cause of the blow-out, claiming it was due to a defect in
manufacture or design.56 The trial court excluded his testimony, relying on Daubert,
but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that Daubert only applied to scientific
testimony.57 The Supreme Court, after looking at the express language of Rule 702
(“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”) and its prior holding in
Daubert (stating it was referring to scientific testimony “because that was the nature
of the expertise at issue”), held that Daubert applied to all expert testimony.58
The Court then considered the question of whether the four factors mentioned in
Daubert were mandatory and exclusive. The answer was no to both questions.
Quoting from Daubert, the Kumho Tire Court stated that the Daubert factors do not
constitute a “definitive checklist or test,” and, quoting from the Solicitor General’s
brief, the Court stated that the “factors identified in Daubert may or may not be
pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s
particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.”59
The Kumho Tire Court took pains to point out that each Daubert factor might not
apply in every case. “It might not be surprising in a particular case, for example, that
a claim made by a scientific witness has never been the subject of peer review, for
the particular application at issue may never previously have interested any
scientist.”60 Again alluding to but not mentioning “junk science,” the Court stated
that general acceptance is useless when the entire discipline lacks reliability, citing
astrology and necromancy as examples.61 The objective of the gatekeeping
requirement is to ensure reliability and relevancy and to make certain the expert
“employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the

53

Compare Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Daubert applies to engineering testimony); Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 366-71 (7th
Cir. 1996); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 296-98 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1196 (1997), with Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518-19
(10th Cir.) (holding that Daubert does not apply to expert testimony of engineering car
rollover case), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996); Desrosiers v. Flight Int’l of Fla. Inc., 156
F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Daubert “may not apply to expert testimony based
on technical, rather than scientific, knowledge.”).
54

526 U.S. 137 (1999).

55

Id. at 142.

56

Id. at 143.

57

Id. at 146.

58

Id. at 147-48.

59

Id. at 150.

60

Id. at 151.

61

Id.
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practice of an expert in the relevant field.”62 To date, this has been the last word
from the Supreme Court on the subject.
III. TRADING MODELS
Trading models are commonly used as a tool to determine the number of shares
traded in a class period to assess damages in securities class actions. When experts
determine damages they do not have the actual trading records of each of the
purchasing shareholders during the class period. The key question for experts
testifying as to damages in securities cases is whether the trading model will satisfy
the criteria laid out in Daubert/Joiner/Kumho Tire; specifically, whether the
principles and methodology used employed the appropriate level of intellectual rigor
in the field. The testifying expert in a securities case will calculate damages by
determining how much the price per share was artificially inflated, multiplied by the
total number of shares damaged. The shares are damaged when the stock price is
artificially inflated by false and misleading statements disseminated to public,
causing the price of the stock to be higher than the price the market would place on
the stock if only truthful information had been available to traders.63 Once the fraud
is revealed or the market no longer places value on the false statement, the inflation
is removed from the stock price and the market value represents the stock’s true
value. As a result, shareholders who purchased during the period of artificial
inflation (the class period) suffer damages. A key variable in the damage calculation
is how many shares traded during the class period represent shares that were
purchased prior to the class period (and thus were previously purchased at an
uninflated price) and how many shares purchased during the class period represent
shares which have already been traded during the class period (and thus been
previously purchased at a price already inflated by the fraud). Shares purchased for
the first time during the class period and held until the end of the class period are
commonly referred to as “retained shares and have been damaged to the full extent
of the artificial inflation.”64 Shares purchased during the class period and resold
during the class period are referred to as “in-and-out” shares.65 The issue for the
trading model to decide is how many shares purchased during the class period were
later sold during the class period and are thus “in-and-out” shares and how many
shares purchased during the class period were retained until the end of the class
period.

62

Id.

63

Michael Barclay & Frank C. Torchio, Complex Litigation at the Millenium: A
Comparison of Trading Models Used for Calculating Aggregate Damages in Securities
Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 106 (2001).
64

Retained shares are damaged by the amount that the stock was artificially inflated when
the shareholder purchased them.
65

In-and-out shares may be damaged if there is partial disclosure of the fraud during the
class period, creating partial damages to the shareholder, or if the value of the false
information changes. For a lengthy discussion of in-and-out damages, see Green v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring). In-and-out
purchasers are often included in the class for class certification purposes. See The Nathan
Gordon Trust v. Northgate Exploration, Ltd., 148 F.R.D. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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A. Determining the Universe of Shares Available to Trade
The starting point of any trading model is to determine how many shares are
available to trade during the class period and how many were actually traded.
Initially, the “adjusted volume-to-float” ratio is determined by calculating the total
number of shares that could have been traded on a given day (the float) and dividing
by the adjusted volume.66 The adjusted volume is calculated by starting with the
total reported volume and eliminating reported volume attributable to intra-day
market makers, specialist trades, and insider trades.67 The float is determined by
subtracting the number of shares that have been known not to trade during the class
period from the total outstanding shares.68 The adjusted volume-to-float ratio is an
important factor in all trading models. As the float declines, so does the number of
retained shares; conversely, as the float increases, the number of retained shares
increases.69
B. Early Versions of the Proportionate Trading Model (Single Trader Model)
The early version of the PTM would be considered crude by today’s standards.
Ten years ago the PTM used gross volume figures without reductions for market
makers or specialists, did not adjust float to control for shares held by insiders, and
did not use institutional trading data.70 This crude model thus used very high float
and volume figures and treated institutional investors (who publicly report their
trades) and individual investors (who do not) as fungible entities in the model. Using
unadjusted trading volume and raw float, each share (whether held by an institution
or an individual) would be given an equal probability of trading the next day.
Whatever the merits or lack thereof of this approach, it bears little resemblance to the
multi-trader PTM commonly used today.
C. Multi-Trader Models
There are several different variations of the PTM. Each of the models have
different formulas and factors. The models can initially be divided into the singletrader PTM and the multi-trader PTM. One of the multi-trader models, the two
trader model, divides the shares of stock into two groups: shares held by active
traders and shares held by passive traders.71 Each of these groups is assigned a
different acceleration factor, which is a proportionality assumption about trading
propensities. Proportional trading models assume that every share purchased has an
equal chance of being sold on a subsequent day in the class period and thus have an
66

Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 107.

67

Id. For instance, a stock traded on the NASDAQ is sold by one market maker and bought
by another market maker, meaning two trades are reported but only one share is sold.
68

Id. This can be determined from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings by
institutions or insiders.
69

Id.

70

See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, The Use of Trading Models to Estimate
Aggregate Damages in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Proposal for Change, in SECURITIES
CLASS ACTIONS: ABUSES AND REMEDIES (Nat’l Legal Center for the Public Interest 1994).
71

Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 108.
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acceleration factor of one. If the acceleration factor rises above one, however, shares
purchased during the class period are more likely to have been sold later in the class
period.72 If the acceleration factor is less than one (actually, a deceleration factor),
the purchased shares are less likely to be sold later in the class period.73 An
accelerated trading model uses an acceleration factor of more than one, as opposed to
the most commonly used PTM among testifying experts for plaintiffs, which has an
acceleration factor of exactly one.74 With a higher acceleration factor, shares that
have traded during the class period are more likely to be re-traded during the class
period than shares that have not traded yet.75 Some multi-trader models divide
traders into two or more groups with different acceleration factors. One multi-trader
model commonly used by defense testifying experts has two groups, one in which
“active traders” are assumed to have held 20% of a company’s stock and have an
acceleration factor 20 times that of “passive” traders, who are assumed to hold 80%
of the stock.76
Barclay and Torchio describe a PTM, with an acceleration factor of one,
commonly used by plaintiffs’ testifying experts in which institutional trading data is
used to adjust the available float. Shares which are known not to have traded during
the class period are removed from shares available to trade.77 The group of shares
with a known trading propensity of zero is removed from the calculations, making it
in essence a two-trader PTM with a group of known non-traders and a group of
traders with an acceleration factor of one.78 In these circumstances, the results of a
two-trader PTM with a set of non-traders and a set of proportionate traders with an
acceleration factor of one is very similar (89% correlation) to a four trader model in
which the group with the highest propensity to trade has an acceleration factor 40
times greater than the lowest propensity trading group.79
Distinctions between the PTM and Multi-Trader PTM are further muted in cases
where there are longer class periods. The statute of limitations for Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) violations is five years and at least three
years for Securities Act of 1993 violations.80 Thus, in cases with a five year class
72
Use of an acceleration factor has been criticized as placing an artificial cap on damages.
Craig J. McCann & David Hsu, Accelerated Trading Models Used in Securities Class Action
Lawsuits, 8 J. LEGAL ECON. 1, 3 (1998-99).
73

Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 107.

74

A decelerated trading model has an acceleration factor of less than one. The most
extreme example is a decelerated trading model in which no shares represent shares already
traded, which can only be assumed until adjusted volume equals float available to trade. This
extreme deceleration model maximizes damages in the shortest period.
75

Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 107-08; McCann & Hsu, supra note 72, at 7.

76

Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 111. Not surprisingly, the popular defense model
results in the lowest possible damages. Id.
77

Id. at 112.

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) (five year statute of limitations for Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 77m (three year statute of limitations for Securities Act violations.) It is a matter of dispute
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period, there should be no discernable differences between the models, because no
matter what acceleration factor is used, traded shares will usually exceed volume.
IV. DAUBERT SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE USE OF THE
PROPORTIONATE TRADING MODEL
The critical issue is whether the PTM meets the criteria for expert testimony set
forth in Daubert. As the plaintiffs have the burden of proof of damages for cases
under the Exchange Act,81 failure to have the testimony admitted would be fatal.82
This issue, surprisingly, is not litigated often.
A. Limited Case Law Discussing the Proportionate Trading Model
There is sparse case law on the admissibility of the PTM. One early case, RMED
Int’l, Inc. v. Sloan’s Supermarkets, Inc. was the subject of both an opinion by the
Magistrate Judge (“RMED I”) and later the Article 3 Judge (“RMED II”) handling
the case. In RMED I,83 the expert calculated inflation per share (by measuring the
difference between closing prices and “true value”) and then calculated the aggregate
class damages by multiplying the inflation per share by the number of shares
affected, using the PTM.84
In RMED II,85 the defendants asked the judge to set aside the magistrate’s order
admitting the expert testimony. The court declined, stating that
Surely, every [s]tock pricing model will be subject to some form of
statistical criticism or unwanted interpretation. The court also recognizes
that aggregate damages in securities fraud cases are generally incapable of
mathematical precision. Nevertheless, to the extent defendants’ concerns
about [the expert’s] analysis are valid, they go to the weight and
credibility of her testimony, not its admissibility.86

whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 changed the statute of limitations for Securities Act
claims from three years to five years in 2002. See In re Global Crossing Sec. Litig., 2003WL
22999478, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that Sarbanes-Oxley Act
extended statute of limitations for Securities Act to five years because claims were negligencebased). The holding of Global Crossing may have been overruled by the Second Circuit when
it held that a claim under the Securities Act that “sounds in fraud” must comply with the
requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). See Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir.
2004). As the language of Sarbanes-Oxley states that statute of limitations for a private right
of action that “involves a claim of fraud [or] deceit is five years,” a plausible argument can be
made that if a claim under the Securities Act “sounds in fraud,” Sarbanes-Oxley extended the
statute of limitations for such a claim to five years.
81

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).

82

The burden of proof of damages is reversed under the Securities Act, with a presumption
of damages and a burden on defendants to disprove damages if they can. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(e).
83

2000 WL 310352 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2000).

84

Id. at *5. The opinion does not explicitly state that the proportionate trading model was
used, but the expert has informed the authors that it was.
85

2000 WL 420548 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2000).

86

Id. at *2 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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The defendants’ remedy was vigorous cross-examination or a rebuttal expert.87
In Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc.,88 the court rejected an expert’s use of the PTM.
The court stated that the plaintiff’s expert admitted that the PTM did not meet any of
the Daubert standards. In criticizing the PTM, the defendants’ expert used a
reliability test for economic theory developed by Milton Friedman: “The reliability
of an economic theory is tested by comparing it to reality.”89 The plaintiff’s expert
stated that the model was never tested against reality and the court noted it was never
accepted by professional economists and “seems to be a theory developed more for
securities litigation than anything else.”90
The statements/admissions by the plaintiff’s expert in Kaufman seems odd, but
odder still is the court’s analysis. First, use of Friedman’s test for reliability seems
out of place in this context. Some theories are impossible to test against reality.
Second, calculating the number of shares damaged by a securities fraud, almost by
definition, will not be of interest to anyone other than a testifying expert in a lawsuit.
It is not surprising the theory was developed in a litigation context.
B. Academic Criticism of the Proportionate Trading Model
The PTM has long been a target of the defense bar and their experts. Since the
PTM is often used by experts testifying on behalf of plaintiffs, it is squarely within
the sights of defendants as a way to limit their exposure.91

87

Id.

88

2000 WL 1506892 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2000).

89

Id. at *2. This is a very odd test to use in a litigation context. A testifying damages
expert in a securities or antitrust case will inevitably hypothesize about what would have
happened “but-for” the wrongdoing. Since the wrong did occur (which is the only reality we
then have), there is no unaltered reality to compare the “but-for” hypothesis to. See Andrew I.
Gavil, After Daubert: Discerning the Increasingly Fine Line Between the Admissibility and
Sufficiency of Expert Testimony in Antitrust Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J., 663, 674
(establishing level of control necessary to create a “but-for” reality is virtually impossible to
achieve). In a sense, it is a variation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which states that if
an object’s precise momentum is known, its position cannot be known with exact certainty.
Likewise, an expert can know precisely what happened in a universe in which the wrong
occurred, but can never state with absolute certainty what would have happened had the wrong
not occurred.
90

Id.

91

Ironically, defendants may soon be hoisted on their own petard on this issue. Plaintiffs
are now bringing what are referred to as “holder” cases in state court for breach of fiduciary
duty or common law fraud claims on behalf of buyers who held stock before the class period
and did not sell during the class period. See, e.g., Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255 (Cal.
2003) (alleging claims on behalf of a holder class for common law fraud); In re Worldcom
Sec. Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying claims on behalf of a holder class
for breach of fiduciary duty); Meyer v. Putnam Int’l Voyager Fund, 2004 WL 199833 (D.
Mass. Jan. 27, 2004) (alleging claims on behalf of holder class for breach of fiduciary duty).
Retained shares in a federal fraud action plus the shares representing holders who did not
purchase during the class period must add up to the float. The defense tactic of using megaacceleration factors minimizes federal securities fraud damages, but maximizes state holder
claim damages.
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One early critique, by a popular defense expert, did not appear in a peer-reviewed
journal, but in a privately published compendium of articles by the securities defense
bar. In the article, Fischel and Ross list six perceived problems with the PTM: 1)
over-estimating volume, 2) “outs-and-ins”, 3) derivative or other securities, 4) noshows and opt-outs, 5) indirect empirical tests, and 6) direct empirical tests.92 We
discuss each in turn.
Fischel and Ross’s first criticism is that the reported volume during the class
period may overstate the number of shares actually traded due to activity by market
makers or specialists. This is not truly a criticism of the PTM, however. No matter
what assumptions are used concerning the propensity of shares to trade during the
class period, reported volume will have to be reduced to account for market makers
and specialists. This has no direct bearing on the accuracy or inaccuracy of the
PTM. It is merely a factual assumption that provides a starting point for any trading
model, and most experts using a version of the PTM will, in fact, reduce reported
volume to account for market makers and specialists.
The second criticism is that the PTM does not estimate the number of investors
who sold shares that were purchased prior to the class period. “[I]t provides no
mechanism for finding out the extent to which investors avoided injury because they
were out-and-in during the Class Period (first selling and then buying).”93 Fischel
and Ross examined institutional holdings for one year of Intel Corp. and stated that
60 million shares were purchased by institutions and held until the end of the year,
but institutions sold 14 million shares during the year prior to their purchases.
“Thus, only 77% of the retained shares were retained by shareholders who were not
out-and-in.”94 The factual predicate of this statement is sketchy and the significance,
if any, is left unsaid. Fischel and Ross conspicuously do not state that the institutions
that sold shares are the same institutions which later bought and retained shares.
Therefore, the assumption that 23% of retained shares were retained by previous
sellers is not a given. Furthermore, even if it were true, Fischel and Ross do not state
what significance this fact has. Under this theory, a buyer who buys stock prior to
the class period (at an uninflated price) and sells the stock during the class period (at
an artificially inflated price) may actually benefit from the fraud.95 For every
securities fraud committed, there are countless unnamed beneficiaries: those people
who sold stock during the class period at inflated prices. The “out-and-in” criticism
seems to be saying that one person’s gain from the fraud must be used to offset the
losses suffered by some other class member.96 This argument was recently rejected
by a judge in the Southern District of New York.97 Likewise, Fischel and Ross state
92

See Fischel & Ross, supra note 70.

93

Id. at 138. They concede the PTM controls for “in-and-outs” during the class period.

94

Id.

95

This “out-and-in” would not be a class member, because he did not purchase shares
during the class period.
96

Typically, a class member who is “in-and-out” during a class period, that is, buying and
then selling, will have either no recognized loss or a much smaller recognized loss than a class
member who is only a purchaser.
97

See In re Blech Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 1610775, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2003)
(holding that defendants are not entitled to an offset for out-and-ins).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005

15

406

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:391

that the PTM does not purport to calculate which purchasers of common stock may
have sold calls or purchased put options and thus profited from the fraud. What
Fischel and Ross seem to be saying is that the damages a purchaser suffers from
buying a stock at a fraudulently inflated price are mitigated if he has sold stock or
options at an inflated price. This may or may not be true, but has no bearing on the
accuracy of the PTM.
Fischel and Ross’s fourth criticism is that not all class members file proofs of
claim. “At best, the [PTM] predicts trading patterns. It does not provide any
information about which class members will file claims.”98 That some class
members will fail to submit a proof of claim to participate in a recovery is axiomatic:
Some class members cannot be located, some cannot be bothered, some simply do
not understand.99 It is true that the PTM does not predict the number of nonparticipating class members; the PTM makes no attempt to do so. What is unclear is
the significance of this truism. The PTM attempts to estimate the total number of
shares traded during a class period and whether those shares were inflated by fraud.
Whether the buyer of the share chooses to submit a proof of claim or not is irrelevant
to the issue of whether that share was damaged.100 The criticism that the PTM fails
to predict the number of class members who will not submit their claims appears to
be based on the premise that if you do not submit a proof of claim, you have not
suffered any damages. This is like saying that if Party A bulldozes Party B’s house
without Party B’s permission, and Party B does not sue Party A, Party B has not
suffered compensable damages. Party B has clearly suffered tortious damages, but
simply has not pressed his claim.
Fischel and Ross also conduct what they call an “indirect empirical test,” again
using institutional trading records for Intel for one year. They state that the PTM
would predict 142.6 of Intel’s 148.7 million outstanding shares were bought during
the year, whereas institutional records state that institutions held and did not trade
77.4 million shares.101 The flaws in this “indirect empirical test” are obvious.
Fischel and Ross admit in a footnote that they made no adjustment to reported
98

Fischel & Ross, supra note 70, at 139.

99

This criticism has been repeated by others. See Robert A. Alessi, The Emerging Judicial
Hostility to the Typical Damages Model Employed By Plaintiffs in Securities Class Action
Lawsuits, 56 BUS. LAW. 483, 488-89 (2001). The “emerging hostility” Mr. Alessi refers to
seem to boil down to two cases, Kaufman v. Motorola, 2000 WL 1506892 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21,
2000), and In re N. Telecom Ltd. Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 56 BUS.
LAW. at 483. One court recently allowed the type of testimony excluded in Kaufman. See In
re Blech Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 1610775, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2003). Thus, one could
say there is an emerging hostility to the hostility shown in Kaufman.
100

See Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 116 (“Each shareholder faces an economic
decision about whether the time and effort required to retrieve trading records and complete
the proof of claims forms is worth the expected damage award. But this individual decision
about whether to file a claim does not alter the economic fact that a given share was
damaged.”). This criticism has been met with judicial skepticism. “Whether or not class
member ultimately submit a claim form, as long as they have not opted out they remain
members of the class and are bound by the judgment.” In re Blech Sec. Litig., 2003 WL
1610775, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2004) (rejecting attack on plaintiffs’ damages expert for
not estimating number of class members who would not file claims).
101

See Fischel & Ross, supra note 70, at 139.
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volume, so their starting point is erroneous.102 They also do not say whether they
adjusted the number of outstanding shares to control for shares held by insiders.
Additionally, most damage estimates using the PTM reduce the float by shares
known to not have been traded, usually through institutional trading reports, which
Fischel and Ross did not do in their test.
Finally, Fischel and Ross state that direct empirical tests undermine the PTM.
Fischel and Ross rely on an article by two of their colleagues for this is discussed
below.103
In addition to Fischel and Ross’s criticisms of the PTM, Dean Furbush and
Jeffery Smith argue that the PTM, with an acceleration factor of one, is unrealistic
because “shares that have not traded recently are less likely to be traded than more
recently traded shares.”104 Furbush and Smith offer no support for this integral
assumption to their thesis,105 and to a large extent it is counter-intuitive. A more
compelling argument can be made that an investor, having recently spent all the time
and money necessary to do his due diligence before purchasing a stock, is more
likely to hold and retain the benefit of the due diligence than to sell and have to begin
the process all over again.106
It has also been said that the PTM, with an acceleration factor of one, maximizes
the damage estimates. This is demonstrably untrue. Maximum damages are realized

102

See Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63.

103

See infra, notes 110-122 and accompanying text.

104

Dean Furbush & Jeffrey W. Smith, Estimating the Number of Damaged Shares in
Securities Fraud Litigation: An Introduction to Stock Trading Models, 49 BUS. LAW. 527, 541
(1994).
105

Seven years after the Furbush and Smith article, two professors have stated that “in
spring 2000, new orders originating from firms that cater to day traders made up
approximately 20 percent of new orders flowing into Nasdaq stocks.” Brad M. Barber &
Terrance Odeon, The Internet and the Investor, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 41, 51 (2001). Shares
purchased by day traders are certainly more likely to trade than other shares. However, while
day-trading may have been a phenomenon in 2000, it is a curious footnote to history in 2004.
106

The hypothesis that recently purchased shares are more likely to trade has been
reiterated in a recent law review article. See John Finnerty and George Pushner, An Improved
Two-Trader Model for Measuring Damages in Securities Fraud Actions, 8 STANFORD J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 213, 230 (2003). Finnerty and Pushner state the that Accelerated Trading Model
is “generally recognized by financial economists as superior to the PTM bcause of empirical
evidence that investors trade the common stocks in their portfolios with different intensities.”
Id. To support this statement, Finnerty and Pushner cite to Furbush and Smith (discussed in
note 104, supra, which offers no empirical support), Mayer (discussed in note 129, infra,
which has no empirical support), Cone and Laurence (discussed in notes 110-122, infra and
accompanying text, which has no empirical support), and two other unpublished articles. The
unpublished articles, William H. Beaver and James K. Malernee, Estimating Damages in
Securities Fraud Cases (1999), at http://www.cornerstone.com/fram_res.html, and William H.
Beaver, James K. Malernee, & Michael C. Keeley, Stock Trading Behavior and Damage
Estimation in Securities Cases (1999), at http://www.cornerstone.com/fram_res.html, contain
no empirical evidence or cite any empirical evidence. If these “financial economists” are in
fact relying on empirical evidence and not wishful thinking, such evidence is not evident.
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when no share purchased during the class period has previously traded in the class
period.107
C. Academic Support for the Proportionate Trading Model
To the extent the Kaufman court relied on the empirical testing and general
acceptance prongs of Daubert in rejecting the proportionate trading model, such
avenues may not be open to future courts considering the issue.108 Recently, an
article was published in Law and Contemporary Problems authored by a graduate
business professor, Michael Barclay, at the University of Rochester, and a
consultant, Frank C. Torchio.109 This article exposes the errors in early criticism of
the PTM and the mythology that has surrounded and grown from these flawed
studies. Professor Barclay and Mr. Torchio expose the fallacies in a frequently cited
criticism of the PTM authored by Kenneth Cone and James Laurence.110 Cone and
Laurence purported to test the PTM against empirical evidence based on claims
submitted in two cases and concluded that the PTM overestimated the number of
damaged shares.
The two cases cited by Cone and Laurence are Biben v. Card (“Midwestern”)111
and Levit v. Aweida (“Storage Technology”).112 In Storage Technology, Cone and
Laurence state that only 9.3 million retained shares submitted claims, whereas they
claim the PTM predicts a class three times that size. Barclay and Torchio show,
however, that this analysis exposes the inherent fallacy of using claims submitted as
a proxy for damaged shares.
Barclay and Torchio analyzed institutional trading records and found that
institutions owned 15.4 million shares before the class period began that were traded
during the class period.113 Thus, at a minimum, there were 15.4 million damaged
shares sold by institutions to class members during the class period. Institutions
owned only 50% of the outstanding shares,114 so shares owned and sold by
individuals to class members must also have accounted for purchases of damaged
shares during the class period as well. At a minimum, the 15.4 million damaged
shares known to have been purchased during the class period by institutions makes
the “9.3 million buy-and-hold shares submitted for claims a misleading and
107
The practical limitation on this is float available to trade, so that once discounted
volume during the class period equals float available to trade, damages are maximized.
108
Even absent any academic support, testimony concerning the PTM would still be
admissible. See Amorgianos v. Nat’l RR Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“Where an expert otherwise reliably utilizes scientific methods to reach a conclusion, lack of
textual support may ‘go to weight, not the admissibility’ of the expert’s testimony.”) (quoting
McCullough v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir. 1995)).
109

Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 105.

110

See Kenneth R. Cone & James E. Laurence, How Accurate are Estimates of Aggregate
Damages in Securities Fraud Cases?, 49 BUS. LAW. 505 (1994).
111

789 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Mo. 1992).

112

630 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Colo. 1986).

113

Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 114.

114

Id.
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inappropriate benchmark for assessing the efficacy of any trading model.”115
Furthermore, in a two year class period, during which the market gained 65% and
Storage Technology lost 75% of its value, 125 million shares traded when 33 million
shares were outstanding.116 Thus, under Cone and Laurence’s analysis, during the
two year class period, 9.3 million shares traded of the 33 million outstanding shares,
and almost 24 million shares did not trade. The 9.3 million shares Cone and
Laurence believe did trade must have traded an average of over 13 times. The 9.3
million number not only fails in light of Barclay and Torchio’s empirical analysis,
but also defies any sort of common sense. Cone and Laurence state that the PTM
predicts about 28 million retained shares.117 This comports with intuitive judgments.
With a volume of 125 million shares with a stock going in the opposite direction of
the market,118 one could expect a near-total turnover of the stock, with the buy-andhold class members being the ones left holding the bag at the end of the class period.
In fact, this is what the PTM predicts: 28 million of 33 million shares were bought
and held, thus 5 million shares of the 33 million remained untraded during the class
period. Cone and Laurence would have one believe that 9.3 million shares were
bought and held, and 23 million remained untraded (with a total volume during the
class period of 125 million). Aside from being demonstrably untrue, as the 9.3
million shares are only 60% of institutional shares known to have been sold during
the class period, the 9.3 million figure violates any sort of common sense given the
volume and the float involved. Use of claims submitted data as a proxy for all shares
bought and held is thus improper.
In the Midwestern case, Cone and Laurence state that the claims submitted were
87% of the shares predicted by the PTM. Although Barclay is quick to disclaim that
this is empirical evidence supporting use of the PTM, he claims a difference of 13%,
when considered with the number of class members who undoubtedly will not
submit claims, is not empirical evidence the PTM is inaccurate.119
Barclay counters the two cases cited by Cone and Laurence with more recent
empirical data from the In re Health Management, Inc. Securities Litigation case. In
Health Management, the plaintiffs’ expert estimated that 5.631 million shares were
damaged using the PTM.120 The claims data submitted showed over 5 million shares
were submitted for claim, or 89% of the number estimated by the PTM.121 Barclay
also notes that if reported NASDAQ volume was reduced by 67% (the number
advocated by Cone and Laurence), instead of 50%, the correlation between shares
submitted for claim and shares predicted by the proportionate trading model would
have been more than 90%.122
115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Cone & Laurence, supra note 110.

118

See Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 114.

119

Id.

120

Id. at 116-17 (citing In re Health Mgmt., Inc., Sec. Litig., 180 F.R.D. 40 (E.D.N.Y.
1999)).
121

Id. at 117.

122

Id.
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D. Is the Proportionate Trading Model Real Science or Junk Science?
The Daubert Court stated that the key issue in determining whether a technique is
scientific knowledge is whether it can or has been tested.123 “Scientific methodology
is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified.”124
In so holding, the Daubert Court is roughly summarizing the scientific process
through paradigms described by Thomas Kuhn in his seminal work, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions.125
Kuhn describes a “paradigm” as that which is “sufficiently unprecedented to
attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific
activity, . . . and sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems . . . to
resolve.”126 A paradigm is “more successful than [its] competitors in solving a few
problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.”127
Certainly, the PTM, with an acceleration factor of one, can be considered a paradigm
in the classic sense. It is unprecedented. In fact the Motorola court recognized it
was created to solve a particular problem.128 It has attracted a large number of
adherents. And to borrow again from Kuhn, all that remains is what he calls
“puzzle-solving,” i.e. solving problems, refining the theory, and testing it.129
Every expert and practitioner now uses some form of the PTM. The issues that
remain are simply ones of refinement. The Multi-Trader PTM represented a step
forward in the evolution of the PTM when it began treating institutional traders
separately from individual traders.130 The only real issue is not whether the PTM
should be used but whether an acceleration factor of one should be used or not. If
science, paraphrasing Kuhn, consists of finding a theory to explain observed facts
and provide hypotheses for future events that serves as a working model until
observed anomalies force a paradigm shift, the PTM seems to function as science.
123

509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).

124

Id. (quoting E. GREEN & CO. REASON, PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
648 (1983)).
125

THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996).

126

Id. at 10.

127

Id. at 23.

128

Kaufman v. Motorola, 2000 WL 1506892, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2000) (“It seems to
be a theory developed more for securities litigation than anything else.”).
129

KUHN, supra, note 125, at 36-39. An alternative way of viewing it is that the PTM,
with an acceleration factor of one, and the multi-trader PTM with an acceleration factor
greater than one, are competing paradigms in a field which has yet to develop its first firm
paradigm. See id. at 15-17. “No wonder, then, that in the early stages of the development of
any science different men confronting the same range of phenomena, but not usually all the
same particular phenomena, describe and interpret them in different ways.” Id. at 17.
130

Thus, the early criticism that the Single Trader Model “takes no special account either
from a volume perspective or an ownership perspective of institutional shares known to have
traded during the [class] period,” is no longer an issue if the expert uses the Multi-Trader
Model calculating institutional and individual damages separately. See Marcia Kramer Mayer,
Best-Fit Estimation of Damaged Volume In Shareholder Class Actions: The Multi-Sector,
Multi-Trader Model of Investor Behavior, at 4 (unpublished 1996) (on file with authors).
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Practitioners in the narrow field of estimating class size use the PTM and use
observed facts to fit within their particular variants of the paradigms as best they can.
Using the criteria set forth in Daubert, the PTM also seems to be “real” science
as opposed to “junk” science. The Daubert test has four prongs: 1) whether the
testimony will assist the trier of fact; 2) whether it is subject to peer review and
publication; 3) the known or potential rate of error; and 4) the general acceptance of
the theory. All four prongs support admitting expert testimony using the PTM.
1. Assisting the Trier of Fact
There can be little argument that the PTM will assist the trier of fact. The
Advisory Committee notes to FED. R. EVID. 702 state that
[t]here is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used
than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be
qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the
particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized
understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.131
A jury, left to its own devices, would have absolutely no idea how to determine the
amount of shares damaged by the fraud. An expert testifying as to damages, using
the PTM to estimate retention damages and in-and-out damages, is thus an
invaluable aid to the jury.
2. Peer Review
The PTM, in its most basic form, has been subjected to peer review and
publication numerous times. Barclay and Torchio forcefully and persuasively make
the case that the Multi-Trader PTM, with an acceleration factor of one, is proper.132
Cone and Laurence argue against an acceleration factor of one, but use a variant of
the Multi-Trader PTM. The question being debated in the journals is not whether to
use the PTM, but which acceleration factor to use. This is a fact about which
reasonable minds can disagree, and is a determination best left to the jury.
3. Rate of Error
The rate of error for the Multi-Trader PTM, using an acceleration factor of one, is
open to discussion. In some ways, the true rate of error will never be known, but
attempts have been made to quantify it. As discussed above, Cone and Laurence
find a high, and in their view unacceptable, rate of error.133 However, Barclay and
Torchio, using more current data, find a rate of error within acceptable tolerances, in
their opinion.134 In the authors’ opinion, the Barclay and Torchio empirical analysis
is sounder, and the rate of error supports admission of expert testimony using the
PTM.
131
See also United States v. Bilzeran, 926 F.2d 1285, 1294 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Particularly in
complex cases involving the securities industry expert testimony may help a jury understand
unfamiliar terms and concepts.”).
132

Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, 114-17.

133

See supra notes 110-122 and accompanying text.

134

Id.
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4. General Acceptance
As stated above, the Multi-Trader PTM, which computes damages for
institutional traders using data from public filings, and then uses this data as a
starting point to compute non-institutional trading volume, is used by both plaintiffs
and defendants in most securities cases. The only difference is the question of which
acceleration factor to use. There is general acceptance on using the PTM; there is
still disagreement on which acceleration factor to use.
V. CONCLUSION
The PTM has all the hallmarks of “real” science, using either a scientists’
definition or that of the Daubert Court. From a scientist’s perspective, it is a
functional paradigm, serving as a working model. The practitioners in the field are
engaged in “clean-up,” for example, deciding which acceleration factor best fits
observed data. Under the Daubert test, the PTM will assist the trier of fact, has been
subjected to peer review (unlike the major critique), and has acceptable rates of error
and general acceptance. Testifying experts may disagree as to which acceleration
factor to use, but that is merely fair ground for impeachment and crossexamination.135 The testimony should be admitted and left to the jury to decide.

135
See D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit in
Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 1933, 1968-69 (2001) (explaining that
unlike novel theories of chemistry or physics, adequacy, limits, and assumptions in
mathematical and statistical models can be readily defined by other experts and thus effective
opposing testimony is generally available).
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